In-Depth Analysis· Turkish defense industry domestic production rate Bayraktar KAAN

Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN

How Türkiye's defense industry reached a roughly 80% domestic production rate, from Bayraktar TB2 drones to the KAAN fighter, and what export controls mean.

TGA

By The Global Anatomy Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 8 min read (1,771 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

Türkiye's officials state that the national defense industry now meets roughly 80% of requirements domestically, a figure Ankara cites as a sharp rise from the dependence of earlier decades.
Military Factories and Shipyards, supported by about 26,000 specialist personnel, form the state-owned manufacturing backbone alongside private firms such as Baykar, ASELSAN, TUSAŞ, Roketsan and MKE.
The Bayraktar TB2 became the best-known export face of the sector, while the KAAN fifth-generation fighter, which first flew on 21 February 2024, is its most ambitious program.
The 80% headline coexists with remaining dependencies on foreign engines and some subsystems, which is why export-control decisions by suppliers remain a live policy debate.
Ankara frames the industry as a self-defense and alliance asset under UN Charter Article 51 and NATO commitments, while critics in some capitals question its export and operational use.

Why It Matters

Türkiye says its national defense industry now covers roughly 80% of its military requirements from domestic sources, up from a heavy reliance on imports a generation ago. The shift has changed Türkiye's operations in Syria and Iraq, its support for Azerbaijan, its posture in the Blue Homeland and its standing inside NATO. It has also created a new export-control and arms-trade debate, because the headline percentage does not erase dependencies on foreign engines, sensors and components.

Background

Türkiye's drive for defense self-reliance grew from a series of supply shocks and security needs. The key stages, as stated in public official and industry sources, are below.

From embargo to industrial policy

1974-1978: After Türkiye's 20 July 1974 intervention in Cyprus under Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the United States imposed an arms embargo that lasted until 1978. Ankara repeatedly cites it as the formative lesson on supply dependence.
1970s-1980s: TUSAŞ (Turkish Aerospace) was founded in 1973, ASELSAN in 1975 and Roketsan in 1988. A dedicated procurement and industrialization authority was created in 1985 and is today the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB), attached to the Presidency of the Republic.
2000s-2010s: Programs shifted from licensed production toward indigenous design. Examples include the MİLGEM corvette project, the T129 ATAK helicopter (developed with foreign engine content) and armed unmanned aerial vehicles.
2016 onward: Following the 15 July 2016 coup attempt by FETÖ (the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization), and amid growing operational demands in Syria and Iraq, Ankara accelerated localization and set the explicit goal of near-total self-sufficiency.

The 80% figure and the workforce

The roughly 80% domestic production rate is a figure given by Turkish officials, including the Presidency and the Ministry of National Defence. Methodologies for calculating such rates differ between countries, and there is no single international standard, so the number is best read as Ankara's stated national indicator rather than an audited benchmark. State-owned Military Factories and Shipyards, described by Turkish authorities as supported by about 26,000 specialist personnel, anchor production of land systems, ammunition, rifles and naval platforms. Private and semi-state firms handle most aerospace, electronics and missile development.

Platform overview

Category	Representative systems	Notes
UAVs / UCAVs	Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Aksungur, ANKA, Kızılelma	Kızılelma is an unmanned combat aircraft; TB2 is widely exported
Aircraft	Hürjet, Hürkuş, T129 ATAK, KAAN	KAAN is a fifth-generation fighter program; first flight 21 February 2024
Land systems	Fırtına howitzer, Kirpi, MEMATT	Fırtına derives from a licensed South Korean design; MEMATT is an unmanned demining vehicle
Naval	TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM, Reis-class submarines	TCG Anadolu is a multi-purpose amphibious assault ship, commissioned in 2023
Missiles and air defense	SOM, ATMACA, HİSAR-O, SİPER	SİPER forms part of the layered air-defense architecture Turkish officials call Steel Dome
Electronic warfare / radar	KORAL, VURAL	Tactical electronic warfare and radar systems by Turkish firms

Operational record

Turkish forces used domestically produced systems in Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), Operation Olive Branch (2018), Operation Peace Spring (2019) and Operation Spring Shield (2020) in Syria, and in the Operation Claw series in northern Iraq. Azerbaijan employed Turkish-made drones during the 2020 Karabakh war. Bayraktar TB2s were also operated by Ukraine from 2022, which made the system globally recognizable. Independent analysts debate how decisive drones were in each case. Many point to the role of air defense suppression, electronic warfare and the quality of adversary air defense.

Key Players & Positions

Türkiye and its industrial base

The Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) coordinates procurement strategy, while the Ministry of National Defence (MSB) oversees state-owned Military Factories and Shipyards. Firms such as Baykar, ASELSAN, TUSAŞ, Roketsan, MKE and Turkish shipyards carry out design and production. Turkish officials describe the objective as strategic autonomy inside the Western alliance system, not outside it.

NATO and allies

Türkiye joined NATO in 1952 and fields the alliance's second-largest armed forces by personnel, according to commonly cited NATO data. NATO officials have generally welcomed allied industrial capacity and interoperability. Turkish systems such as the TCG Anadolu and MİLGEM-class ships operate within allied naval standards. Some allies, however, have linked arms-trade policy to political disputes.

Export-control debates

Several supplier governments have restricted exports to Türkiye or reviewed their licensing, and these decisions are attributed here to the governments concerned:

United States: Türkiye was removed from the F-35 program in 2019 after it acquired the Russian S-400 air defense system. Washington imposed CAATSA sanctions on the SSB in December 2020. The US government's stated reason was the S-400 purchase.
Canada: Ottawa suspended and later reviewed export permits for certain targeting sensors used on Turkish drones after the 2020 Karabakh war, citing concerns over their use there.
European states: Following Operation Peace Spring in October 2019, several European governments, including Germany, announced restrictions on arms exports to Türkiye. Later years saw partial easing and new procurement discussions, with national policies differing.

Rules differ by country: arms export licensing is national, governed by laws and by regimes such as the EU Common Position on arms exports and national end-use rules, so readers should consult the relevant national authority.

Critics and analysts

Human rights organizations and some parliamentarians in Europe and North America argue that exports of armed drones and other systems should be tightly conditioned on end-use. Independent defense analysts also point out that the 80% figure does not guarantee autonomy in critical inputs such as jet engines, advanced semiconductors and some optical payloads.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Self-defense and border security. According to Turkish government statements, including those of the Ministry of National Defence and the Presidency, domestic systems enable Türkiye to defend its roughly 1,300 km (about 800 miles) southern border and to counter PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH threats at their source. The legal basis cited is the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. See Counter-Terrorism at Source for the doctrine.
Lessons of dependence. Ankara argues, as in repeated official statements, that the 1975-1978 US embargo and later licensing restrictions showed that critical capabilities cannot rest on a single foreign supplier. It therefore treats indigenous production as a security requirement rather than a commercial preference.
Alliance contribution, not alternative. According to the Ministry of National Defence and the Turkish Foreign Ministry, a stronger Turkish industrial base strengthens NATO's southern flank, Black Sea security and burden sharing. Turkish officials criticize political arms embargoes among allies as inconsistent with alliance solidarity.
Maritime protection. Turkish official texts link the naval fleet and the indigenous drilling and seismic vessels to the protection of sovereign rights in the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan), including rights consistent with Türkiye's 2020 continental shelf registration with the UN. See the Blue Homeland guide for the legal framework.
Responsible use and transparency. The Turkish side states that its forces apply precision and proportionality, citing efforts to protect civilians and cultural and religious heritage in operations. It rejects accusations that exports are intended to fuel conflict, noting that sales are conducted under state authorization.

Source Comparison

Coverage varies sharply by outlet and region. The table below summarizes common framing differences and does not endorse any one of them.

Issue	Common framing in international media and think tanks	Turkish official framing
The 80% figure	Impressive but difficult to verify; ignores foreign engines and components	Evidence of national capacity; the rate is described in official statements by the Presidency and MSB
Drone effectiveness	Significant in specific theaters; sometimes overstated beyond contested airspace	Proven multi-theater capability and a platform for precision
Export controls	Linked to concerns over end-use, human rights and regional conflicts	Political restrictions among allies are viewed as unjustified and counterproductive
NATO role	Mixed: valued capacity, but tension over S-400 and the F-35	A reliable ally whose capacity benefits alliance security
Operations in Syria and Iraq	Debated legality and civilian-harm concerns	Lawful under Article 51 and aimed at terrorist organizations

Readers can compare these with primary documents from the Presidency of Defence Industries, the Ministry of National Defence, NATO and the supplier governments. For the site's approach to separating fact from position, see the Editorial Principles and the Fact Check hub.

Domestic production rate: A national indicator of the share of defense requirements met by local industry. Definitions vary between countries.
UCAV: Unmanned combat aerial vehicle, a drone capable of carrying out strike missions.
Fifth-generation fighter: A fighter that emphasizes stealth, sensor fusion and advanced networking. KAAN is Türkiye's program in this class.
CAATSA: The US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, used in 2020 against the SSB.
Montreux Convention: The 1936 treaty that governs passage through the Turkish Straits. Türkiye applied Article 19 on belligerent warships during the Russia-Ukraine war. Read more in The Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Mediation.
Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine on maritime jurisdiction in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean. See also Türkiye's 2025 Marine Spatial Planning and IOC-UNESCO Registration.

For the broader mission of the publication, visit The Global Anatomy home page.

The Global Anatomy presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues it covers alongside the legal and historical arguments supporting it. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

By The Global Anatomy Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

World Agenda Review: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN — How Türkiye's defense industry reached about 80% domestic production, from Bayraktar TB2 drones to the KAAN fighter, and what it means for NATO and autonomy.
Index of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and the 80 Percent Domestic Production Claim — How Türkiye's defense industry works, from Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN: what the 80% domestic production claim means, export-control concerns, and rankings.
Archive of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN — How Türkiye's defense industry reached an official ~80% domestic production rate, from Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN and TCG Anadolu, with critics' views.

Frequently asked questions

What does the 80% domestic production rate mean?

It is the share of Türkiye's defense requirements that Turkish officials say is now met by domestic industry. The figure comes from official statements and there is no single international method for calculating it. Dependence on foreign engines, sensors and some electronics continues in specific programs.

Which Turkish systems are best known internationally?

The Bayraktar TB2 armed drone is the most widely recognized, followed by the Akıncı UCAV, the ATMACA anti-ship missile, the TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship and the KAAN fighter program. Air defense systems such as HİSAR-O and SİPER are also prominent.

What is KAAN and where does the program stand?

KAAN is Türkiye's indigenous fifth-generation fighter developed by TUSAŞ. It made its first flight on 21 February 2024. Its full domestic engine is still in development, so early prototypes rely on foreign-sourced engines.

Why do some countries restrict arms exports to Türkiye?

Governments have cited different reasons. The United States acted over the S-400 purchase, with the F-35 removal in 2019 and CAATSA sanctions in 2020. Some European states and Canada pointed to concerns over operations in Syria and the Karabakh war. Ankara rejects these restrictions as political and as damaging to alliance solidarity.

How does Türkiye justify its use of domestic weapons in cross-border operations?

Ankara relies on the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter and says the operations target PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH threats while respecting Syria's and Iraq's territorial integrity. Critics and some international bodies raise legal and civilian-harm questions, which Turkish officials dispute.

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

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